Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1971

Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus
George A. Bermann
Columbia Law School, gbermann@law.columbia.edu

Ballard Jamieson Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
George A. Bermann & Ballard Jamieson Jr., Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80 YALE L. J.
1261 (1971).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2194

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus
Although students have traditionally paid little attention to university disciplinary codes, recent campus disturbances have given these
codes unprecedented significance.' Those subjected to disciplinary proceedings have charged, among other things, that the provisions which
regulate their behavior are too vague to inform them of what they may
and may not do.2 Arguing that a broadly-worded code of conduct is
necessary to govern, university administrators, however, have refused
to make their regulations more precise. 3
Although the public university is an administrative agency of the
state, 4 it is more like a political subdivision than the state and federal

1. Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 23,27 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Dunmar v. Ailes, 348 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Speake v. Grantham, 317 F.
Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss. 1970); Siegel v. Regents of Univ. of CaL, 308 F. Supp. 832 (N). Calif.
1970); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), afJ'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969); Esteban v. Central Mo.
State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mos. 1968), afJ'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969). cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), afj'd, 407 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970); Goldberg v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Car v. St. John's Univ., 34
Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. CL), rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 aJJ'd
mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18,235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
In response to the rising number of student challenges to university disciplinary proceedings the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri met en banc to establish
guidelines for deciding such cases. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 FRD. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
3. See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969). A recent survey of all
accredited colleges in Ohio revealed widespread reliance on tague regulations. The results
were as follows:
(a) Each responding institution has such a regulation; (b) many of the regulations are
vague or provide no standard at all; ... (c) in the 805 disciplinary actions reported
in 1966 and 1967 by the 20 responding institutions, 150 or 18.67 were taken pursuant
to general conduct regulations by admission of those institutions.
Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 Ohio ST. L.J. 1023, 1035-26
(1968.)
4. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872, 876
(W.D. La. 1970), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1971) (No. 1252); Brooks v.
Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 197 (A.D. Ala. 1969), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969);
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468
(1967).

The point is made succinctly in Note, The Emerging Law of Student's Rights, 23 ARE.
L. R v. 619, 622-23 (1970):
A state school is unquestionably an arm of the state, performing a public function.
exercising discretion committed to it by the legislature, and regulating citizens affected
by its activities by means of combined governmental functions. By treating school problems as problems of administrative law, the courts can give direct recognition to the

prmary fact of life in the school environment-the presence of state power applied
to a specified, ongoing task.
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regulatory agencies that readily come to mind as typical administrative
bodies. Like a political subdivision, the state university is charged with
the governance of a multi-faceted communityY In discharging its
various functions the university "owns or controls ...residences, classrooms, laboratories, offices, meeting places, restaurants, gymnasiums
and playing fields... and [it] maintains its own police force, hospital
[and] parking lots .. ."6 As the individual utilizes each of these
facilities and assumes different roles, a different series of regulations may
govern his relationship to the university. But, although some of these
regulations are relatively narrow in the scope of activities to which they
refer, those that have been challenged in the courts are usually "very
general catchall rule[s] of good conduct," such as one prohibiting "Disrespect for University authority; [and] any other infractions of standards
of conduct that require severe disciplinary action." Another typically
broad rule stipulates that:
Students of the college are expected to conduct themselves as
ladies and gentlemen both within the College and elsewhere. For
student conduct which is outside the jurisdiction of the College,
but which tends to discredit or injure the College, the President
is authorized by the Board of Visitors to impose such penalty as he
may deem appropriate, including expulsion from the College.9
Such vaguely phrased rules purport to govern the individual in all his
campus roles.
These rules also prescribe a variety of sanctions for their violation.
Among the penalties at the disposal of college officials are disciplinary
probation, loss of social privileges and fines. Since few students have
taken the time and energy to contest legally the imposition of minor
sanctions, 10 the rules most often subjected to judicial review for vague5. Note, Private Government on the Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions,
72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1386 (1963).
6. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th
Cir. 1969).
7. Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed from Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 40, 63 (1966).
8. Jones v. State Bd.of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), afJ'd, 407 F.2d
834 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
9. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 626 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1968),
aJJ'd,415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
10. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1070 (1969). Ex-

ceptional cases are Siegel v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 308 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Calif. 1970)
(student placed on probation for a one-year period, permitting him the privileges of a
student, but prohibiting him from holding student government office or engaging in other
extracurricular activities) and Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College Dist. Bd. of Trustees,
9 Cal. App. 3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970) (student received a three.day suspension,
which did not deny him the right to take examinations, and was placed on probation for

the next term). Because courts are more reluctant to review the imposition of mild sanctions, students may fail to seek such review. On the range of lesser penalties available to
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ness are those that have authorized suspension or the so-called "academic
death penalty," expulsion."1
In the rising volume of cases in which they confront the problem of

unclear student rules, 2 the courts, apparently adopting the universities'
viewpoint, have been reluctant to require precision in the regulations

that define the scope of student freedom. 13 Whether they permit uni-

versities to punish students without any rule at all, 1' whether they
require rules but reject the constitutional requirement of precision as
"inapposite" to them,; or whether they simply lower standards of
precision so that they may be easily met,10 the courts have, with one
notable exception,' 7 effectively kept the vagueness doctrine off campus.

university officials, see Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D.
Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Van Alstyne,
The Student as University Resident, 45 DMvER LJ.582, 606-08 (1968); Van Alstyne, The
Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. Rrv. 290, 297 (196).
11. Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DEz.'vER L.J. 582, 606 (1963).
See also Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 Mmii. L. REv. 393, 598-99 (1971).
12. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 135
(V.D. Mo. 1968); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 176 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Note,
The EmergingLaw of Students' Rights, 23 Amx. L. REv. 619 (1970).
13. See cases cited, supra note 2 (except Soglin v. Kauffnan, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Wis.
1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969)).

14. According to Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968), "The right of
University administration to invoke its disciplinary powers need not be entirely bottomed
on any published rule or regulation." See also Norton v. Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn.
State Univ., 419 F.2d 195, 200 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 US. 906 (1970). But cf.
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 552 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
15. Jones v. State Bd.of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 201-02 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407
F.2d 834 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert. dismissed, 597 U.S. 31 (1970).
16. This lowering of standards is reflected in the easy assumption of the court in Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970), that students possess sufficient intelligence to understand virtually any campus
rule:
[We do not find the regulation at all difficult to understand and we are positive
[..
the college student, who is appropriately expected to possess some minimum intelligence, would not find it difficult.. . .. We must assume [plaintiffs] can read and
that they possess some power of comprehension.
See also Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1271 (S.D. Miss. 1970). Even Judge Do)le,
while invalidating a University of Wisconsin regulation as unconstitutionally vague, suggested:
Nor is it necessary or wise presently to decide whether the standards of vagueness
and overbreadth are to be applied as stringently to university regulations of conduct
as to criminal statutes in non-university life.
Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1968). The court also suggested that
different levels of precision might be appropriate in rules governing different aspects of
campus life. Id. at 991. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that its opinion did
not purport to resolve the latter issue. 418 F.2d 163, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1969). Since it is impossible to generalize from such opinions concerning the degree of precision required of
umversity rules, one cannot determine whether a decision adverse to student claims stems
from repudiation of the vagueness doctrine on campus or merely a lowering of the degree
of precision required.
17. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969), aff'g 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.
Wis. 1968).
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A typical case is Esteban v. CentralMissouri State College. 8 Plaintiff
left his dormitory to observe, at a distance of a hundred feet, the dispersal of a mass student demonstration in which, according to the court,
he was at no time an active participant. Esteban initially ignored a faculty member's request that he return to his room. He subsequently complied but not before questioning the instructor's authority and the
existence of any rule imposing a curfew. The instructor followed Esteban into the building and obtained his name from the resident assistant
of the dormitory. In anger, Esteban swore at the informer and emptied
a waste can at his feet. For "conduct unbefitting a student," Esteban was
suspended from college. 19 Both the district court and the court of appeals refused to apply the constitutional requirement of precision to
university misconduct regulations. In so doing, the Esteban opinions accurately reflect what has become the standard judicial response to
20
vagueness attacks on campus rules.
On several occasions where First Amendment freedoms were directly
involved courts have in fact invalidated a campus regulation for uncertainty of meaning. Not only has a series of speaker bans been held
unconstitutionally vague,2 ' but so have rules restricting student freedom

to assemble, 22 to establish political organizations," and to determine
18. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), a/i'd, 415
F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 598 U.S. 965 (1970).
19. The operative provision read in full:
All students are expected to conform to ordinary and accepted social customs and to
conduct themselves at all times and in all places in a manner befitting a student of
Central Missouri State College. . . . Conduct unbefitting a student which reflects
adversely upon himself or the institution will result in disciplinary action.
Id. at 626 n.4.
20. See note 13 supra.
21. Pickings v. Bruce, 480 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1970); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 903
(N.D.Miss. 1969) ("charged with crimes'); Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777
(E.D.Tenn. 1969) ("competence" of speaker, "libelous, scurrilous or defamatory'), Brooks

v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), af/'d, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) ("convicted!'); Snyder v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (NM). 111. 1968) ("sub.
versive, seditious and un-American"); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C.
1968) ("Communist or subversive"); Dunbar v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Junior College
Dist., 275 Cal. App. 2d 14, 79 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1969); Buckley v. Meng, 85 Misc. 2d 467, 280
N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (regulation requiring program "to be compatible with the
aims of Hunter College" before accorded use of facilities). But cf. Lieberman v. Marshall,
236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970) (university order restraining student groups, not recognized by
university, from using university facilities for rally, held a valid limitation on first amendment rights).
22. Sword v. Fox, 317 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Va. 1970) (state college requirement that
demonstrations be registered with office of student activities 48 hours in advance held
unconstitutional suppression of spontaneous expression, and regulations prohibiting
indoor demonstrations of any kind held unconstitutionally vague absent a showing that
only such a total ban could prevent disruption).
23. ACLU of Virginia v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 898 (W.D. Va. 1970)
(A.C.L.U. members granted declaratory relief that under the First Amendment they were
entitled to recognition as a state college campus chapter); Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp.
1275, 1280 (D. Conn. 1970) (state college cannot constitutionally regulate the recognition
of campus political organizations under vague standards).
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the editorial content of campus newspapers. 2 ' The emphasis in these
opinions on elements of free speech, however, seems to set them apart

from non-First Amendment cases and to suggest that a court which
declines to acknowledge the presence of important First Amendment
rights can readily avoid applying the vagueness doctrine.
This limitation of the vagueness doctrine to First Amendment cases
seems an inadequate response to the problems of uncertainty in campus

regulations. This Note will seek to show the presumptive applicability
of the vagueness doctrine to university rules generally, to demonstrate
the special need for requiring precision on campus, and to confront
the judicial arguments against that requirement. Finally, the Note will
consider some implications of adopting the doctrine in the university
setting.
I.

The Case for Precise Rules on Campus

A.

The Purpose of the Vagueness Doctrine
The "vagueness doctrine" is a well-established constitutional principle
which has met with considerable judicial favor in other contexts.-" Its
requirement that standards of conduct imposed by the government be
reasonably precise stems from several due process goals derived from
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 2 0 First, precision in terms
affords the individual adequate warning 2 -"fair notice"--that sanc-

24. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1333 (D. Mass. 1970) (requirement that

students submit newspaper articles to administrators prior to publication held unconstitutional, since no guidelines of acceptability were established to limit administrative
discretion); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1957) (rule
precluding editorial criticism of state governor or legislator held unconstitutional); Ham-

mond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (rule prohibiting
"parades, celebrations, and demonstrations" without prior approval of college authorities

held invalid as a prior restraint on First Amendment rights); Egan v. Moore, 20 App. Div.
2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 199 N.E.d 842, 250 N.Y.S.id 809

(1969) (injunction against Communist's lecture at state university reversed in absence of
showing that he would advocate fordble overthrow of the government as any more than
an abstract doctrine).
25. For general discussions of the vagueness doctrine, see Aigler, Legislation in Vague
or General Terms, 21 MxcE I. REv. 831 (1923); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-

An Appraisal, 40 CoRsr, L.Q. 195 (1955); Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L. Ray. 77 (1948); Note, Void for Vagueness: An Fscape from
Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Comment, Legislation-Requirement
of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 Msct. L. Rnxv. 264 (1954). In the particular
context of the university, see Note, 48 N. CAR. L.REv. 943 (1970); Note, Uncertainty in
College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 Omo Sr. L.J. 1023 (1968).
26. The requirement of precision, first formulated as a component of due process under
the Fifth Amendment, has been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Comment, Legislation-Requirement of Deliniteness in Statutory Standards,
53 M cH. L. Rav. 264, 267 (1954).
27. In university regulations, as in other enactments, adequate notice would apprise
students not only that certain behavior was punishable but also that it v'ould entail
substantial sanctions rather than some token rebuke or deprivation.
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tions are attached to conduct he contemplates. 28 Secondly, by specifying
to enforcement officials exactly what the rule-maker intended to proscribe, precise rules lessen the freedom of those officials to make that
determination for themselves. This diminishes the likelihood that enforcement officials will act arbitrarily or discriminatorily. 29 Thirdly, the
elimination of vagueness promotes the judicial function by informing
courts of the rule-maker's perceived interest in governing conduct.
Such insight into the purpose behind the rule enables a court to assess
both the constitutionality of that rule and the fairness of its application
to a given set of facts.30 Finally, when regulations identify with precision
the conduct that is prohibited they reduce the "chilling effect"-the
inhibition of freedom that emanates from uncertainty as to the scope
31
of permissible conduct.
28. The generally accepted formulation is contained in Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926):
[A ] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as

to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
Elaboration of this rationale is found in Justice Frankfurters dissenting opinion in Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948). See also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966);
United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation
Comm. of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,
89 (1931); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914); International Harvester Co. v. Ken-

tucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-23 (1914); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 68 (1960). In the university context, the fair notice rationale

has been explicitly recognized in Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 984 (W.D. Wis. 1968),
af'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
29. See Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 472, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 931 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
The administrator, whether consciously or not, has substituted his own bias and
predilection for the letter of the standard. And he has been able to do this because
the standard itself does not supply him with sufficient criteria for decision; the
administrator has filled a decisional vacuum, so to speak.
See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939):
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926); Note, Uncertainty in College
DisciplinaryRegulations, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 1023, 1028 (1968); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 80, 90 (1960).
30. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927); Gable v. Jenkins, 909 F,
Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 592 (1970); People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 258
N.E.2d 206, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1970); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 80 (1960). The lawyer, an agent of the court, also
finds precision helpful in preparing to represent his client. See United States v. McClough,
263 A.2d 48 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
31. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S,
11 (1966); Ashton v. Kentucky, 884 U.S. 195, 200 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 580 U.S.
479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U,S, 147,
151 (1959); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. RIv,
67, 75 (1960).
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B. In Loco Parentis and Vague Rules

The judicial failure to apply the vagueness doctrine to university
rules was a natural corollary of the traditional legal view of the university suggested by the phrase in loco parentis.2 Under that view, it
was assumed not only that universities possessed the inherent power to
discipline but also that they would use that power benignly. At the
same time, students were thought to regard university officials as friends,
counselors or parents. According to this view, familial concern would
fairly resolve conflicts within the community.
The argument that the university was entitled to act in loco parentis
lent itself in several respects to a toleration of vague rules. Viewed as
"children," students did not need precise rules because they could
rely on "parents" to make their expectations reasonably understood,

and, in any event, to temper discipline with understanding." Beyond
this, the purpose of university education, like parental discipline, was

82. For a formulation of the in loco parentis doctrine, see John B. Stetson Univ. v.
Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924):
As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare of the pupils,
college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may make any
regulation for their government which a parent could make for the same purpo ....
Classic cases applying the in loco parentis doctrine include Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky.
376, 161 S.W. 204 (1919); North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill.
296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891); Clasen
v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 024 App. Div. 487,
231 N.YS. 435 (1928).
A rival "privilege" theory also led the older courts to give broad discretion to the rulemaking powers of universities. This doctrine was formulated in North v. Board of Trustees,
137 M. 296, 306,27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891):
The will of the student is necessarily subservient to that of those who are for the
time being his masters. By voluntarily entering the University or by being placed
there by those having the right to control him, he necessarily surrender very many
of his individual rights.
The notion that attendance at an institution of higher education constituted a privilege
rather than a right was approved by the United States Supreme Court in Hamilton v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 93 U.S. 245 (1934). Later Supreme Court cases, however, have
explicitly rejected the view that the state can attach unconstitutional conditions to enjoyment of such governmental benefits. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 985 US. 589
(1967). The Court has also repudiated the notion that attendance in a state university is a
privilege and not a right. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US. 203,
251 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Recent cases in the lower federal courts have rejected the right-privilege distinction. Esteban
v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 993 U.S. 965
(1970); Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872, 877 (W.D. La. 1970),
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1971) (No. 1252); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310
F. Supp. 248, 252 (D. Neb. 1970). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1442.49 (1968). Other
university disciplinary cases flatly reject the idea that a universit) education, however it is
labelled, is a luxury in modem society. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Tro), State

Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Knight v. State Bd.of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174
(M.D. Tenn. 1961).
33. See Note, The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 Am L. Rv. 619 (1970).
More than a century ago, however, the court in Lander v. Seaver 32 Vt. 114, 122-23 (1859),
cautioned against overrating the "love and understanding" exhibited by educators to their
students.
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assumed to be character building rather than punishment.34 In ordering
the relationship between student and administration precise rules
seemed neither necessary nor appropriate.3 5
After dominating legal analysis in the area of student-university
relations for many years, however, the in loco parentis doctrine has
fallen into disuse.3 6 The changing realities of campus life have destroyed the assumptions upon which the doctrine was based. The small,
closely-knit college has given way in great measure to relatively large
and impersonal institutions.3 7 Not only has the mean age of college

students risen dramatically, 3 but also the responsibilities and privileges
of citizenship have been extended to younger age groups. Undoubtedly
in recognition of these and other changes, universities have abandoned
conscious character-building as their primary educational mission. 9
Suspension or expulsion of a student is more likely to be described today
as punitive than remedial. 40 In view of their rejection of the older
34. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala, 625,
95 So. 34 (1923) (immorality); Douglass v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211 (1909)
(drinking); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924) (smoking); State
ex rel. Dresser v. District Bd., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232 (1908).
35. Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MICH. L. Rxv. 393, 400 (1971).
36. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725, 729 (MD.
Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 756 (W.D. La. 1968),
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 876-77, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (1967); ConREIzX UNsvinSsTr,
REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF UNIVERSITY [EAtILA.
TIONS AND LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL IAW (Sept. 27, 1967) (Prof. Allan P. Sindler, Chmn,);
Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 515 (1968); Van
Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. Rav. 290,
292 (1968); Note, Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L REV. 1045 (1968).
No unified model has yet emerged to replace in loco parentis, but a "publie service"
model has been proposed on more than one occasion. See, e.g., Heyman, Some Thoughts
on University DisciplinaryProceedings,54 CAIF.L. REv. 73, 74-75 (1966); Linde, Campus
Law: Berkeley Viewed from Eugene, 54 CALir. L. REv. 40, 64-65 (1966). More recently, a
civil-law model of student discipline, emphasizing restitution by wrongdoers to their

victims, has been suggested. Carrington, Civilizing University Discilline, 69 Micit. L. RLV.
393, 409 (1971).
37. See Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D.Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d
163 (7th Cir. 1969); Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1967);
Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1971); Van Alstyne,
The Student as University Resident, 45 DENvR L.J. 582, 591-92 (1968).
38. See Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 591 (1968).
See also Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), a#Id, 418 F.2d 163
(7th Cir. 1969); Note, Private Government on the Campus-judicial Review of University
Expulsions, 72 YAuE LJ. 1362, 1380 (1963).
39. According to the Student Discipline Committee at the University of Oregon,
-moral growth' or 'character development' should not be included within the definition
of the fundamental purposes of the University .. ." Linde, Campus Law: Berheley piewed
from Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 43 n_5 (1966). See also Perkins, The University and Dule
Process, 62 AM. LIBRARY ASS'N BuLL. 977, 980 (1968); Note, The Emerging Law of Studentis'
Rights, 23 AnK. L. REv. 619, 626 (1970); Note, Private Government on the Campus--

Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1380 (1963).

40. Commentators have recognized the punitive element In college discipline, "Intle

great majority of cases expulsion will constitute a penalty . . . [S]chools would appear
unable to assert (as they might for lesser forms of discipline) that the purpose of their
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analogy to describe the student-university relationship, the courts might
have been expected to recognize the possibility that vague rules would
have a pernicious effect on campus. Thus, their continued reluctance
to require precision in university rules is curious.4 '
C. The Vagueness Doctrine and Its Application to University Rules
According to the vagueness doctrine,4 whenever the (1) government
seeks, through the (2) imposition of sanctions, to place (3) restraintson
individualfreedom it must avoid using language so (4) vague "that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
'43
as to its application.
Although some courts acknowledge that the elements of the vagueness
doctrine are present in university disciplinary practices, they have at
times raised a distinction between legislative and administrative bodies

to justify less stringent application of the vagueness doctrine to campus
regulations.4 4 The distinction assumes that courts as a general rule lack
the expertise to make an independent judgment about the degree of
precision attainable in areas, like student discipline, whose regulation
has been delegated to administrative agencies. 45 Whatever the validity
of this assumption in the case of a particular administrative agency,
the courts have evidently declined to adopt the legislative-administrative
distinction as a reliable means of identifying those governmental restraints that they are capable of reviewing for vagueness.40 Rather, courts

action was not punishment: Note, Private Government on the Campus-udicial Review
of University Expulsions, 72 YA
L.J. 1562, 1392 (1963). Yet the courts have not alwa)
acknowledged the punishment inherent in even the harshest sanction, expulsion. See General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Distpline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 142 (W.D. Mo.

1968).
41. Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline,69 Mica. L. REv. 393, 400-01 (1971).
42. See note 25 supra, especially Note, The Vold-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. 1.
LRv. 67, 94 (1960).
43. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
44. See Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1271-72 (S.D. Miss. 1970); Jones v. State
Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970); see also Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal,40 CoRNEI.L L.Q. 195, 233-37 (1955).
45. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969), af'g 290
F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Speake v. Grantham, 317
F. Supp. 1253, 1272 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
46. The courts have frequently struck down administrative regulations for vagueness:
AL Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 US. 614 (1946) (Revised Maximum Price Regulation
promulgated pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Wilner v. Department

of Health, 5 Misc. 2d 331, 159 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. CL 1957) (regulation requiring that
nursing homes employ certain types of personnel); State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 173
S.E.2d 47 (1970) (fishing regulation issued by the State Wildlife Resources Comm;sion);
Attic Club, Inc. v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 450 S.IV.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (regulation governing operation of private clubs which hold liquor licenses); cf. United States v.
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have chosen to confront the language of administrative regulations on
the same footing as they have confronted statutory language-on a case
by case basis to determine whether, in the context, greater precision
could have been achieved.
Since application of the vagueness doctrine on campus should not
turn on such a putative distinction, it is necessary to explore the dimensions of each element of the vagueness doctrine and to inquire whether
these elements are, in general, present in campus disciplinary practices.
Current "state action" doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that not only "public," but also a good many "private" colleges
and universities, reflect the first of these elements-the exercise of
government power-when they prescribe campus rules.41
The second element of the doctrine, a restraint on personal freedom,
is almost by definition present in every university regulation, for the
very purpose of such regulations is to restrict the freedom of students

to act as they please. In applying the doctrine in other contexts, courts
have not been especially concerned with defining precisely the extent
or type of the restraint on a particular freedom. Thus, in the area of
assemblies, rules imposing an absolute ban on gatherings, rules requiring prior permission and rules merely limiting the time or place in
which gatherings may occur have all been the subject of judicial scrutiny

Seaboard Airline R.R. Co., 225 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.C. 1964) (I.C.C. regulation pertaining
to safe transportation of explosives). In Atwood's Transp. Lines, Inc. v. United States,
211
168, 170 (D.C.C.), aff'd,
d.Supp.
373 U.S. 377 (1962), it was said that "[r]ules and regulations
promulgated
governmental
establishments
pursuant
to statutory
authority have
the force
and effect by
of law,
and concededly
are subject
t the same
tests as statutes.
47. The conventional view continues to bold, however, that private universities are
exempt from the strictures of due process. See, e.g., Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp.
626 (D.
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The Vagueness Doctrine on Campus
for vagueness. Rather than focusing on the type or the restraining effect
of the rule, courts tend to stress the importance of the freedom regulated. The freedom to assemble, for example, seems to be more precious
to a community and thus more carefully guarded by the courts than
the freedom to operate a motor vehicle. But though delineation of
preferred freedoms may prompt special judicial scrutiny of rules, courts
have not exempted other rules from scrutiny altogether.
The presence in university discipline of the third element-sanctions
-has been the subject of greater controversy. Some courts have rejected
the view that student discipline amounts to punishment at all, preferring to characterize it as an integral part of the educational process.4 s
Since most courts have taken the position, however, that whether university discipline is invoked for educational or punitive purposes, it
inflicts harm upon a student, campus rules therefore meet the third element of the vagueness doctrine.
Although recognizing harm, the courts as a matter of practice have
applied the vagueness doctrine with less rigor where that harm is not
severe.49 Thus, a few courts have intimated that the standards of precision are lower when a civil sanction such as university dismissal is at
stake, presumably because such a sanction is generally thought to be
less severe than a criminal one.50 Admittedly, the majority of vagueness cases involve criminal enactments.61 But as early as 1925 the

48. See, eg., Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1272 (S.D. Miss. 1970); Esteban v.
Central mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), afl'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
49. Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HAIW. L RLV. 77,
85 (1948).
50. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel.
258 U.S. 242, 250 (1922). Several opinions such as Esteban v. Central Mo. State College,
415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969), affg 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1963). cert. denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970), rely upon the civil-criminal distinction in upholding %ague campus

rules:

[1]t is not sound to draw an analogy between student discipline and criminal procure....
Certainly these regulations are not to be compared with the criminal
statute. They are codes of general conduct which those qualified and experienced in
the field have characterized not as punishment but as part of the educational process
itself and as preferably to be expressed in general rather than in specific terms.

See also Norton v. Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195, 200 (Gt Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 899 U.S. 906 (1970); Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1271 (S.D.

Miss. 1970); Siegel v. Regents of Univ. of Cal,, -08 F. Supp. 832, 836 (N.D. Calif. 1970).
General Order on Judicial Standard of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 142, 146
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
For an interesting discussion of the inadequacies of the analogy between criminal law
and university discipline, see Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 Micu. L. REv.
393 (1971).
51. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968):
While the question of vagueness has most frequently arisen in criminal prosecutions,
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Supreme Court held that whether a penalty is criminal or civil is
irrelevant to the need for precise rule-making 2 This seems sound, for,
by itself, the fact that a penalty is denominated criminal or civil is not

necessarily an accurate indication of its impact. Most courts have, in
fact, disregarded the criminal-civil distinction in determining when
circumstances warrant a meaningful vagueness inquiry.63
A more accurate measure of severity, and one to which the courts
seem more responsive in other areas, is the degree to which a sanction
disrupts an individual's life and forecloses him from future opportunities.5 4 For the student, suspension or expulsion from a university is

obviously severe. 0 Besides constituting a social stigma, such sanctions
it has been applied in a variety of other situations where the obedience to a rule
.or standard has been exacted.
The following cases are leading examples of vagueness attacks on criminal enactments.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (fine and imprisonment); Boyce Motor Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 377 (1952) (fine and imprisonment); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948) (misdemeanor); M. Krans & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946)
(substantial criminal fines).
Interestingly, some universities incorporate the criminal law into their own misconduct
codes. For example, one institution made punishable "[a]ny act in violation of city,
county, state or federal law." Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 201 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert. dismissed,
897 U.S. 31 (1970). Thus identical language may be valid or invalid under the vagueness
doctrine depending on whether it is used as a standard of behavior on campus or off.
52. A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 289 (1925):
The ground or principle of the [Cohen and Weed] decisions was not such as to be
applicable only to criminal prosecutions. It was not the criminal penalty that was
held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague
and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.
According to one commentator:
No logical basis can be found for such a [civil-criminal] distinction, since notice to the
persons affected may be equally as important in one case as in the other. It might
even be argued that it is more important in the case of civil statutes, since such
statutes are more often looked to for guidance before the act than are criminal
statutes.
Comment, Legislation-Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 Micit. L,
REv. 264, 273 (1954).
53. Government enactments whose violation led to civil sanctions have been struck
down for vagueness in the following cases: Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F. Supp. 458 (N.D,
Ill. 1942) (loss of right to appear on election ballot); Hewitt v. State Bd. o Medical Ex.
aminers, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906) (revocation of certificate to practice medicine); Parks
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 860 111. 130, 195 N.E. 616 (1935) (liabillty for civil
damages); Chicone v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 20 Ohio App. 2d 43, 251 N.E.2d 864 (1969)
(suspension of liquor license); Booth v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 177, 88 S.E.2d 916 (1955)
(loss of right to purchase or possess alcoholic beverages); cf. Pike v. CAB, 803 F.2d 853 (8th
Cir. 1962) (loss of flying license).
As recently as 1967, the Supreme Court reiterated in dicta that "the 'void for vaguenez'
doctine [is] applicable to civil as well as criminal actions." Boutillier v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 887 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
54. See note 53 supra, especially Pike v. CAB, 303 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 1962).
55. The district court opinion in Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis.
1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969), took judicial notice that:
[1r], the present day, expulsion from an institution of higher learning, or suspension
for a period of time substantial enough to prevent one from obtaining academic
credit for a particular term, may well be, and often is in fact, a more severe sanction
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interrupt or terminate a student's academic training and may ruin the
college record on which his career depends. Thus the highest standards
of precision would seem warranted for rules that impose these sanctions.
At the other extreme will normally lie such inconsequential penalties as
a small monetary fine, an official reprimand, or a brief loss of social

privileges, all of which would justify less rigorous application of the
doctrine. Between these extremes falls a wide variety of sanctions. The
exact location of a particular penalty on the spectrum of severity will
depend upon the court's weighing of relevant factors. 0 Thus, for ex-

ample, if called upon to evaluate the severity of a student's disqualification by school administrators from membership in a legal honor society,
a court might inquire whether the complainant could still practice law,

choose his field of specialization, attract clients and earn as high an
income as society members.5 7
The mere fact that sanctions in a given case are not especially severe
does not, of course, foreclose a rigorous application of the vagueness
doctrine. As noted, when constitutionally preferred freedoms are
involved, rules imposing penalties substantially less severe than suspension or expulsion have been subjected to the highest standards of precision.58
Vagueness itself, the fourth element of the doctrine, has been extremely difficult for courts to identify in practice.59 The doctrine seeks

above all to assure that a government enactment is sufficiently clear to
all those who must look to it for guidance-the individual in planning

than a monetary fine or a relatively brief confinement imposed by a court in a criminal
proceeding.
The court did not decide whether the vagueness doctrine is applicable to disciplinary
regulations whose potential sanctions are mild, such as a denial of social privileges or a
minor loss of academic credit. Id. at 991. The severity of university dismLssals, however, is
almost universally recognized today. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Edun, 294
F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 930 (1961); Note, Private Government on the
Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 72 YALE .J.1862, 1363-65, 1592 (1963).
56. The mere notation of disciplinary action of any seriousness on a student's record
may jeopardize his future. If a court is sympathetic to this and accords it great weight,
penalties milder than suspension or expulsion will presumably meet the test of substantial harm.
57. While vagueness was not an issue in Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d
935, 942, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1970), the court consulted such factors in evaluating the
severity of non-election.
58. See notes 21-24 supra.
59. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (19-8) is
the classic exposition of the difficulties of identifying vagueness and achieving precision:
But "indefiniteness" is not a quantitative concept. It is not even a technical concept
of definite components. It is itself an indefinite concept. There is not such a thing
as "indefiniteness" in the abstract, by which the sufficiency of the requirement expressed by the term may be ascertained . . .That which may appear to be too
vague and even meaningless as to one subject matter may be as definite as another
subject matter of legislation permits. ...
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his future conduct according to it, the government official in enforcing
it, and the courts in reviewing its constitutionality and overseeing its
application. In measuring its effectiveness in supplying this guidance,
courts have examined statutory language in the light of a number of
relevant factors: common understanding and usage of the words employed, background and knowledge of the individuals affected, prior
judicial and administrative interpretations and the possibility of greater
precision. Obviously, deciding whether a regulation is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process is a delicate and complex task. Moreover,
since vagueness is fundamentally a matter of degree, courts are likely
to disagree over what regulations are unconstitutionally vague.,, Should
a regulation be found void for vagueness, courts may also disagree on
its cure. Thus one court may be satisfied by the substitution of the word
"disorderly" for "ungentlemanly" in a given rule while another might
find those words equally unacceptable.
The doctrine would probably prove no less elusive on campus than
off. University rules, like rules elsewhere, differ in the degree to which
their language provides the guidance required by due process. But
those regulations that lie at the extreme of indefiniteness, the catchall
rules described earlier, 61 should surely fall under any application of the
doctrine.
The Special Nature of the University Setting
Like the multitude of government enactments subjected to the constitutional requirement of precision, many university disciplinary regulations satisfy the prerequisites of the vagueness doctrine. But more than
a lawyer's impulse to extend a doctrine to new areas underlies the logic
of this Note. In the special context of the academic community, the
"
evils which the requirement of precision was designed to prevent
assume unusual proportions and give to the vagueness doctrine itself
particular urgency.
Initially the evil of inadequate warning that inheres in vague rules
would not seem any more grave on campus than off. It is true that
students should find it no harder to derive adequate warning from the
D.

60. See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLvrf.
L. REv. 527, 528 (1947); Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L.J. 437

(1921).

61. See p. 1262 supra. This seems especially likely since some courts, in refusing to
apply the vagueness doctrine on campus, have nonetheless acknowledged the vagueness of

many of the rules currently in use. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 283 (D. Colo. 1968).
62. See p. 1266 supra.
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actual words of a university rule than from any other government enactment. But courts hold that a standard of conduct whose actual words
are vague may still provide sufficient notice if a precise meaning can be
imputed to it from community norms.0 Such "constructive notice,"
however, should not be easily inferred on campus, 4 for it requires that
there be informal agreement on behavioral standards. Such consensus
probably characterized some closely-knit college communities in the
past. But the changing realities alluded to earlieo cast increasing doubt
on the assumption that such a consensus exists on most campuses today.
Through their admissions policies, universities temporarily bring together a culturally diverse cross-section of students6 0 Through the
education they offer, they foster independence, creativity-and often
therefore nonconformity. These developments have occurred on campuses where, as part of society's growing cultural and political cleavages,
students more frequently disagree not only among themselves but also

1

63. FTC v. R.R. Keppell & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1934); Fox v. Washington,
236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); Smiley v. Kansas, 196
U.S. 447 (1905). In Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, reu'g
34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct), aJ'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18,

235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962), the New York Appellate Division reversed a lower court's
reinstatement of students who had been dismissedifor taking part in a civil marriage
ceremony. To do so, it assumed that to Catholic students and authorities at a Catholic
university, the standard of behavior requiring students to act "[i]n conformity with the
ideals of Christian education and conduct" would be understood to mean "Catholic"
ideals, under which participation in such a ceremony would be disapproved. See aho
the references to community norms in Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D. Colo.
1968) and in Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of CaL, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 8S0, 57 CaL Rptr.
463, 472 (1967).
64. The existence of several groups on campus whose norms may be radically different is
one reason that constructive notice should not readily be inferred. As one commentator put
it, "Is it the conduct of the community, the administration, the faculty, or one's fellow
students one must use as a standard of acceptability?" Note, Uncertainty in College Di.
ciplinary Regulations, 29 Omo ST. I.J. 1023, 1030 (1968).
65. See p. 1268 supra.
66. The lower court in Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 324, 231 N.YS.2d 403,
410 (Sup. Ct), rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962), took notice of the heterogeneity of college students,
even of those attending a Catholic university, by observing that the standard in question
was susceptible to "a variety of meanings, each subject to different interpretation by
students of different backgrounds." Commentators have more frequently called attention
to the growing diversity within the university population. According to Wilson, Campus
Freedom and Order, 45 DENvER L.J. 502, 506 (1968):

Confronting the realities involves taking into account the fact that many institutions

today are large and heterogeneous aggregations of human beings with competing and

sometimes conflicting purposes. ...
Their size and heterogeneity, their increased
outside involvements, their enhanced importance, their enmeshment in processes of
rapid social change--these, and other circumstances, give new and enlarged dimensions
to the problems of campus freedom and order.
See also Van Alsyne, Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 591-92 (19653. The
fact that the student population changes every four years has also been cited as evidence
for the need to give clear guidance to students in determining their behavior. Note,
Private Government on the Campus-judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YAr
UJ. 1362, 1403-04 (1963).
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with those who make and enforce the rules that govern them. A consensus on behavioral norms is unlikely in a community of this descrip.
tion and cannot be relied upon to provide the adequate warning absent
in vague rules.
Furthermore, the second vice of vagueness--the potential for vague
rules to be applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily-is often heightened
on campus.8 7 In expressing political dissent or experimenting with novel

life-styles, students are challenging not only distant political figures and
abstract social norms but also the administrator or faculty member who
directly governs their college life. They represent a threat both to his
authority and position on campus and to the personal values-cultural,
social, and political-that he may hold. Since the administrator or faculty member may come into daily contact with students who offend him,
this threat to his position and values may seem to him all the more immediate and pervasive and furnish him with special incentive to make
use of the arbitrary and discriminatory potential of vague rules.08 So
motivated, he may call upon any of his strategically placed colleaguesadministrators, faculty, and enforcement officials with whom he works
so closely in the academic community-to initiate disciplinary proceedings. There is a greater immediacy between the individual and the
policing mechanism on campus than there is elsewhere in society. At the
same time, persons outside the academic community may also exert the
usual pressures upon enforcement officials to discipline in an arbitrary
or discriminatory fashion. 9
Undoubtedly many students are aware of their vulnerability to
reprisals from campus figures whose authority and values they challenge.
This fear of the opportunity given university administrators to act
arbitrarily and discriminatorily makes students reluctant to take a full
part in campus activities.70 Even apart from this fear, vague rules necessarily generate a clouded and uncertain environment. Students cannot

67. Perkins, The University and Due Process, 62 A1. Lina,,y Ass'N Bu,. 977, 980
(1968):
...[A]rbitrariness is not unknown in the most elite intellectual circles. Administrators
are not uniformly capable of distinguishing between what they consider desirable and

what is acceptable to a consensus of the community. Operating under pressure, as
administrators do much of the time, they can be insensitive to the most rudimentary
forms of justice and fair play.

See also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1086 (1969).
68. See Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 Ono ST. L.J. 1023,
1031, 1035-36 (1968).

69. Id. at 1034; see, Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rzv. 1027, 1084

(1969).
70. Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 1028, 105

(1968).
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feel at liberty to exercise the freedom they possess if they are unsure
of its borders. Such inhibition is one of the evils, the "chilling
effect," that the vagueness doctrine seeks to eliminateY' Since a university community depends heavily on the vigorous exercise by its members of their freedoms, 72 in particular their First Amendment rights to
speak and to write as well as to utilize less conventional means of
expression, the indirect chilling of those freedoms is especially pernicious on campus. If one of its purposes is to encourage individual free
inquiry, the academic community, more than any other, will suffer from
governance by vague standards.73
III. The Case against Precise Rules
A. University Autonomy
The most common explanation offered by the courts for their decision to keep the vagueness doctrine off campus is that judicial intervention to require regulatory precision would unduly interfere with the
functioning of the university. 74 It is difficult to understand what is
meant when the courts, as they so often do, describe student discipline
as "a proper exercise of [the university's] inherent general powers to
maintain order on the campus," 75 or premise it upon "the wide discretion traditionally given school officials in administration of their affairs."'76 Such characterizations conceal why the university's rules are

71. See TAN p. 1266 supra.
72. In Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957), Chief Justice Warren
explained the importance of the First Amendment to the university,
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and umversities would imperil the future of our Nation....
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding- otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.
Similar statements have been made more recently in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 593 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968).
73. Vague university rules may impair judicial review no more than do vague rules elsewhere. But the campus, as shown above, remains unusually vulnerable to the other evils of
vagueness.
74, See, e.g., Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1272 (S.D. Miss. 1970); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd.of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 757-58 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley,
281 F. Supp. 280, 285-86 (D. Colo. 1968); Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). Schuyler v. State Univ., 31 App. Div. 2d 273, 297 N.Y.S2d 863 (1969);
Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 7S9 (1902); State ex rel. Sherman
v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.Wi.2d 822 (1942); cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1948).
75. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 881, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,
473 (1967).
76. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd.of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 767 (W.D. l.a. 1968).
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immune to judicial review for vagueness. 77 However, inferences from
the cases suggest that two related but distinguishable concerns underlie
the courts' reluctance to impose upon the draftsmen of university
regulations a requirement of precision. First, judicial intrusion onto
the campus might substitute the courts' own inexpert views for those
of university officials.73 Secondly, whether or not judicially mandated,
precise rules might deprive administrators of the flexibility they need
to deal with the diverse problems that arise in their community.7 9

Analysis of both concerns suggests that neither warrants judicial
acquiescence in vague university rules.
1. The Impact of JudicialIntrusion:Inexpertise
The vagueness doctrine does not call upon judges to second-guess the
university on the substance of its disciplinary policy. In striking down
a vague university rule, courts would not substitute their own views
on what student conduct to punish. Instead they would encourage the
university to reformulate its own interests, subject, of course, to substantive constitutional limitations. By definition, the vagueness doctrine
only requires that the university define prohibited conduct with precision and clarity. The doctrine is a familiar judicial tool and, like the
due process hearing for university discipline required by Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education,8 0 is predicated on the competence
of courts to assess the fairness of form.
77. The use by courts of such conelusory arguments has concealed the precise Interests
at stake. As one commentator stated: "[O]ne of the problems with student cases all along
was that the school's discretion was assumed rather than analyzed." Note, The Emerging
Law of Students' Rights, 23 Am L. Rv. 619, 623 (1970). Cf. Perkins, The University and
Due Process, 62 Am. LIBARY Ass'N BuLL. 977, 981 (1968). See also Note, Private Government
on the Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1366 (1963).
78. According to the court in Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (D. Conn. 1970):
No court should interfere in reviewing the wisdom of any [university] policy adopted,
provided there is no invasion of constitutional due process of law, substantively or
procedurally. It is not the business of the court nor is it within its prerogative to
interfere with or attempt to administer college rules and regulations.
See also Speake v. Grantham, 817 F. Supp. 1253, 1272 (S.D. Miss. 1970). The notion that
courts ought not to interfere with so-called "academic judgments" has prevailed since the
earliest cases. North v. Board of Trustees, 137 111. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891); People ex rel
Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Il1. 186 (1866). Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 A. 882
(1924); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 198 App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y.. 849
(1921); Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 516, 525, 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
144 (1901). At least one university president has expressed concern that courts may soon be
substituting their judgment for that of university administrators. Perkins, The University
and Due Process, 62 AM. IABRARY Ass'N BULL. 977, 978, 980-81 (1968).
79. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1968),
aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 598 U.S. 965 (1970); Due v. Florida A & M
Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963). See also General Order on Judicial Standards
of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Disdpline in Tax Supported Institutions
of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Note, 48 N.C.L. Rav. 943, 947 (1970).
80. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'g 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), cert. denied,

1278

The Vagueness Doctrine on Campus
However limited the intrusive effect of the vagueness doctrine, there
is a class of standards, commonly called "academic," to which the doctrine should probably not apply. Within this class clearly fall standards
established by the university to evaluate student scholastic performance
on examinations and papers and to determine the overall level of achievement required for a degree and for academic honors. Because these
standards and their application in a given case reflect the judgment of
persons familiar with the educational process, the courts, as a prudential
matter, have exercised restraint in reviewing their reasonableness and
their particular applications.8 1 Perhaps the same considerations should
make courts wary of evaluating even the precision of those standards.
However, as we move away from these purely "academic" judgments
toward other spheres of student life such as extracurricular activities,
off-campus conduct and modes of dress, the courts have shown considerably greater willingness to review substantively both the reason-

268 US. 950 (1961). Dixon held that before a student attending a tax-supported institution
of higher learning may be expelled for misconduct he is entitled to notice, a statement of
the charges against him, the names of witnesses and the nature of their proposed testimon,

and, most importantly, the opportunity to present his defense before a disciplinary body
whose report is to be made available for his inspection. For application and elaboration of
the Dixon requirements, see, e.g., Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (Sth Cir. 1958),
aff'g 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161
(W.D. Mo. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.
Mich. 1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Woody v. Bums, 188
So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). For an earlier case foreshadowing Dixon, see State ex
rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 177 S.W2d 822, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (19-12).
Courts have disagreed over whether the right to counsel is included within the right of
state university students to procedural due process. In Madera v. Board of Educ. of City of
New York, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), rerlg 267 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 C2d Cir.). reu'g 269 F. Supp. 900
(E.D.N.Y. 1967); and Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 594 US. 905 (1969), courts refused to impose the requirement.
But the opposite result was reached in French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La.
1969), Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 752 (E.D. La. 1968), and
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
When the student faces only minor sanctions, courts have dispensed with the Dixon requirements. Eg., Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal. App.
3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970). But see Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp.
416 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
81. The courts uniformly eschew reviewing grades or other indida of scholastic performance. Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110, 111-2 (S.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd, 392
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 893 U.S. 936 (1968); West -. Board of
Trustees of Miami Univ., 41 Ohio App. 567, 181 N.E. 144 (1931). Perlhps the most frequently cited case for this refusal is Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 160
(D. Vt. 1965):
The reason for this rule is that in matters of scholarship, the school authorities are
uniquely qualified by training and experience to judge the qualifications of a student,
and efficiency of instruction depends in no small degree upon the school facultys
freedom from interference from other noneducational tribunals.
See generally Beaney, Students, HigherEducation and the Law. 45 Drv- L.J. 511, 519-20
(1968); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L .Rv. 1027, 10 9-70 (1969).

1279

The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 80: 1261, 1971

ableness and application of university rules, presumably because they
feel more qualified to deal with such subject matter.8 2 If these spheres
of student life are appropriate subjects of substantive judicial review,
it seems odd that they should still lie beyond reach of the vagueness
doctrine.
2. The Impact of Precise Rules: Loss of Flexibility
A second objection to applying the vagueness doctrine to university
disciplinary rules is that precision, whether or not judicially mandated,
deprives university administrators of the flexibility they need to deal
with the diverse problems that may arise on a university campus. 88
Courts have frequently endorsed this view but have offered little explanation and no proof of how precise rules would interfere with the
capacity of the college administration to govern. One can, however,

imagine several ways in which precise rules might reduce the flexibility
needed by those who must govern the university.
One argument is that the formulation of a precise code would divert
the attention of members of the university community from more conventional academic pursuits.84 Obviously, someone will have to devote

82. See, e.g., Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970),
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1971) (No. 1252) (requirement that students
live and eat meals in university facilities upheld as reasonable); Resclenberg v. Nelson, 310
F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) (college rule banning long hair held unreasonable in absence
of showing that such hair in fact disrupts educational process); Mollere v. Southeastern La.
College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969) (college rule requiring minor female students to
live on campus, while allowing others to live off campus, where only reason offered was
need to fill dormitory vacancies, held unreasonable); Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College,
305 F. Supp. 857 (SD. Texas 1968) (prohibition against beards on campus held invalid In
absence of rational relationship to health, welfare, morals or discipline of students); Moore
v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (state university rule reserving the right of officials to enter and inspect dormitory rooms held reasonable as necessary to institution's operation); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (NJ). Ala.
1967) (university classification of male students by their hair style, based on personal dislike
of long hair, held unreasonable and a violation of equal protection); Sigma Chli Fraternity
v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966) (campus ban on racially restricted fraternities upheld as reasonably required to preserve an atmosphere conducive to
study).
83. See note 79 supra.
84. Commentators disagree on the extent to which a requirement of precision would
divert resources from other pursuits. A pessimistic note was sounded in Note, 5 I-IousroN
L. REv. 541, 547 (1968):
The courts have never stated that a university must provide a specific regulation for
every type of forbidden conduct. Such a prescription would force university officials
to spend unknown time drafting regulations rather than carrying out more pressing
administrative duties.
In direct response to this assertion, however, Professor Charles Wright, who participated

in the drafting of a precise code at the University of Texas, asked "[W]hat more pressing

duty is there for any of us involved in the life of a university than to put our inteXsmi

affairs into a condition that will narrow 'the gap of mistrust' and, hopefully, spare our
campus the anguish of Berkeley and Columbia." Wright, The Constitution on the Cantpus,

1280

The Vagueness Doctrine on Campus

the extra measure of time and energy that the drafting of precise rules
requires. But this expenditure of resources would not be as great in the

long run as it might at first seem. The drafting of a precise code would
entail an initial investment of time and energy, but once drawn it need
only be periodically updated as experience under the code and changing
circumstances recommend. Further, the development of model codes by
a few universities will lessen the rule-making burden on others.8 5 Once

formulated, such codes can be adapted to the special needs and features
of these other universities with minimal investment of administrative
talent.8 6
Of course, to the extent that members of the university community
are engaged in this endeavor, they will be diverted from the more
conventional duties of studying, teaching and research. But, a high
level of attention to the drafting of student disciplinary rules should
not be regarded as a waste or misallocation of resources, not only
because these rules have generated controversy on campus,87 but because a good many educational opportunities may inhere in hammering them out. Among these might be numbered the formulation and
defense of one's personal and social values and articulation of them in
concrete language.88 For example, a code provision which regulates
political demonstrations requires a thoughtful balance between the
interests of the university community in preventing disruption of its
operations, on the one hand, and in promoting expression of beliefs, on
the other. Viewed in light of this educational potential, the attention

of students, faculty and administrators to the problems of precise rule-

making seems more an integral part of academic life than a diversion
from it.89

22 VARD. L. REV. 1027, 1063-64 (1969). See also Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline,
69 icH. L. trv. 393, 405 (1971).
85. See, e.g., The University of Oregon Student Conduct Program, reprinted and discussed in Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed from Eugene, 54 19L. L. RaY. 40, 47, 67
(1966); ABA Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities,A Statement of the Rights
and Responsibilitiesof University Students (Nov. 1, 1969 draft).
86. Precise rules will also save the disciplinary panel the effort that would otherwise be
required to decide the meaning of the university's general misconduct rules before applying them to a given case.
87. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAwN. L. REv. 1027, 1I4 (1969).
88. Clinical programs to develop forensic and legislative skills have already become
standard features of law schools where their academic relevance is apparent.
89. Several other advantages of precise rules are closely related. Participation by the
entire community in the rule-making process will provide the additional educational opportunity for practical experience in self-government. Moreover, if it is true that a community best obeys laws that are enacted with its participation and consent, such a code
will be more effective. See Joint Statement on Student Rights and Freedom of Students,
art. IV(c), 43 Ais. Ass'N. U. PROF. Bur_.. 365 (1967); Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MicH. L. Ray. 393, 399-400 (1971).
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Difficulties not only in the formulation of precise rules but in their
implementation as well may account for the courts' fear that a loss of
administrative flexibility will result from application of the vagueness
doctrine on campus. Specifically, student codes that forbid misbehavior
in precise terms and provide for its punishment would arguably limit
administrative options in two respects. Officials might find themselves
compelled to punish the proscribed conduct whenever it occurred, and
they might be prevented from punishing behavior unmentioned in the
code. In assessing the magnitude of these constraints, it may be helpful
to identify types of situations whose special characteristics demand a
flexible response.
One such situation requiring flexibility is disciplinary action against
a student offender who mistakenly violated a rule, appears genuinely
repentant, or for any other reason would benefit from a relaxation of
discipline. Precise rules would seem to preclude leniency toward him,
since there inheres in their plain meaning a pressure, absent in vague
rules, toward literal, and often harsh, application. Precision thus curtails prosecutorial discretion-the decision whether or not to bring
charges.
But the discretion afforded enforcement officials by vagueness in the
definition of substantive offenses is not the university's sole source of
flexibility. The disciplinary panel itself will have ample occasion to be
lenient since it retains the opportunity to interpret the university's regulations before applying them and to allow a student a range of defensesY0 Even if the panel finds him guilty it will ordinarly have latitude in fixing a penalty 1 In so doing, it may consider the circumstances
of the violator and the violation, including all extenuating factors, in
mitigating or otherwise tailoring the punishment to suit the individual
case.
A second type of situation in which precise rules might prevent a
flexible response is the case of a student whom administrators regard as
generally unsuited to the institution but who, having violated no specific regulation, cannot be punished.92 This student may be socially or

emotionally disturbed, lacking in motivation, simply immature or
otherwise unready for college. He would arguably benefit from a tern-

90. The opinion in Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1284 (S.D. Miss. 1970), explicitly recognized the latitude enjoyed by a disciplinary panel in the fact-findlng process.
91. For an example of the typical misconduct regulation which specifically delegates unfettered discretion to university officials to determine penalties, see note 9 supra.
92. For a description of the generally-unsuited student, see Note, Private Government
on the Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 62 YAix L.J. 1362, 1392 (1963).
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porary or even permanent severance from the university. Undoubtedly
there are those students who would reject an informal recommendation
by the university that they voluntarily withdraw from college. But,

taken together, a number of the university's well-established prerogatives seem to render vague rules unnecessary in meeting this situation.
The university's control over its admissions standards and procedures
enables it at an early stage to reject the applicant who for any reason
appears "generally unsuited."13 Although a student's unreadiness for
college may not be detected at this early stage, his maladjustment so
frequently entails substandard scholastic performance that the university's unquestioned authority over academic affairs will often permit it
to handle his case. Indeed, the university has the virtually unqualified
privilege not only to establish its own academic standards but also to
apply those standards to an individual's performance.,- In any event,
this student may be more appropriately cared for by the university's
own therapeutic or remedial services than by punitive disciplinary
measures.9 5 Without recourse to vague rules, these well-established prerogatives furnish the university with sufficient flexibility to cope with
the second type of student.
A third type of situation requiring flexibility involves the student
whose deliberate intention it is to frustrate university policy embodied
in its disciplinary regulations by carefully confining himself to offensive
behavior that the university has neglected to include in its precise
code.98 The vague standards of "ungentlemanly behavior" that are cur93. An unconventional attempt to review state university admisions policies was made

in Lesser v. Board of Educ., 35 Misc. 2d 896, 232 N.Y.Sd 151 (Sup. CL 1962), which
granted relief to a high school student who had been denied college admission as a
non-tuition paying student, on the theory that the university's failure to consider the
fact that he had pursued an unusually difficult course of study in high school constituted
a reviewable administrative error. The court directed reconsideration of petitioner's
application and an upward adjustment of his grades. The Appellate Division reversed.
18 App. Div. 2d 388, 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963), repeating the familiar holding that courts
may not interfere with administrative decisions of state agencies in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion.

94. See note 81 supra.

95. On the relationship of therapeutic services to discipline for misconduct, see generally

Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1968), af)'d, 415 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Linde, Campus Law: Be.eley Viewed

from Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 49 (1966); Van Alstyne, Judicial Trend Toward Student
Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290, 297 (1968); Note, Private Government on the
Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 62 YALE L.J. 1362, 1407 (1963).

96. It has been suggested that just such individuals make catchall misconduct regulations necessary. Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 0on1 ST. Uj.
1023, 1034 (1968). Dissenting in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 525, 533 (1948),

Justice Frankfurter must have been contemplating much the same kind of person when he warned that "[of a law is framed with narrow particularity, too easy
opportunities are afforded to nullify the purposes of the legislation ... Legislation must
also avoid so tight a phrasing as to leave the area for evasion ampler than that which is
condemned:'
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rently in use enable the university to reach such an individual. But to
suggest that precise rules would prevent the university from disciplin.
ing him would be mistaken. Although the university might be tempted
to bend its precise disciplinary provisions to reach the individual whose
course of conduct may violate the spirit, though not the letter, of the
law, this practice would do violence to the very values upon which the
vagueness doctrine is predicated. The more principled, though less ex.
pedient, response to this rare individual would be for the university to
amend its code so that such misbehavior will not again go unpunished.
The fact that a clearly drawn code may assist those few students who are
not well-intentioned does not justify a refusal to seek precision.T
This analysis indicates that precious little flexibility is at stake despite
intimations by the courts that precise rules would divert the academic
community from its proper pursuits and deprive administrators of
latitude in dealing with difficult students. Moreover, emphasis on the
difficult cases should not obscure the overriding fact that, because they
focus their deterrent effect on specific forms of anti-social behavior,
precise rules may actually help the university achieve its disciplinary
goals.
B. Substitutes for the Vagueness Doctrine
None of the other possible reasons for the courts' refusal to apply the
vagueness doctrine is more persuasive than those analyzed above.
Certain of the cases seem to suggest that courts do not attach
significance to precision when they are satisfied that the student's other
constitutional rights have not been violated. At least one court discounted a claim of vagueness when the student had enjoyed the
hearing mandated by Dixon.98 As noted, other courts seem to require

precision only of regulations which on their face govern First Amend.
97. According to Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 Onto ST.
L.J. 1023, 1036 (1968):
General terminology has admitted conveniences to administrators, but its use reflects
an obsessive fear that a single student may go unpunished for an unforeseen and unacceptable departure from the norms of campus behavior.
Linde suggests that an occasional escape from punishment is a commonplace cost of our
judicial system generally. Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALmr.
L, REv. 40, 63 (1966).
98. The court in Dunmar v. Ailes, 848 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1965), aff'g 280 F. Supp.
87 (D.D.C. 1964), reasoned:
Appellant's second contention is in effect that the Cadet Honor Code ... is void for
vagueness.... Appellant's conduct was first found to violate this code by the Cadet
Honor Committee, a student body entrusted with such matters, second by a board of
officers before which Appellant had a full trial-type hearing, third by a reviewing
board, fourth by the Superintendent of the Academy.... We are in no position to
find too vague the code thus found applicable.
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ment rights.09 However, the assumption that other constitutional prindples afford the university student as much protection as he needs is false
because vagueness raises unique problems which only precision can
remedy.
A belief that Dixon renders the vagueness doctrine unnecessary on
campus is not warranted because no procedural safeguards-for example, the right to a hearing, advice of counsel and cross-examinationwill fully protect a student whom the university prosecutes under vague
regulations. By the time of such a hearing, vague regulations might
already have denied the student adequate notice that his conduct was
punishable, permitted enforcement officials to treat him in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner, and exerted a "chilling effect" on his and
others' constitutionally protected freedoms. And if the student should
appeal an adverse determination, the vague rule under which he was
prosecuted may continue to prejudice him. Its ambiguity may deprive
the reviewing court of a clear statement of the university's perceived
interest in proscribing his behavior, without which the court could
not assess the constitutionality of the rule or the fairness of its application to his case.
Equally unfounded is a belief that the First Amendment is functionally equivalent to the vagueness doctrine. First, freedoms beyond those
protected by the Amendment may be chilled. Second, reliance on the
First Amendment overlooks the other evils of vagueness-insufficient
notice, excessive administrative discretion and inadequate judicial review. In holding that the vagueness doctrine has added importance in
First Amendment cases, 100 the Court must be implying that it has basic
importance even in areas where the First Amendment does not apply.
C. Limitations on the Vagueness Doctrine
Courts seldom apply any doctrine mechanically. They tend instead
to develop exceptions when use of the doctrine would seem inappro99. As previously indicated, pp. 1264-65 and notes 21-24 supra, with the exception of
Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). aff'g 295 F. Supp. 978 PV.D. Wis. 19q).
the cases that have utilized the vagueness doctrine to invalidate university rules have all
directly involved the First Amendment. This may indicate a judicial assumption either
that First Amendment protection fully prevents the evils of vagueness or that no individual
rights except those subsumed by the First Amendment are worthy of protection from the
vices of vagueness. Both assumptions, as this Note will show, are false. There is language

in Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 881, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473
(1967) suggesting that once disciplinary action has been found to be "a proper exercise of
[the university's] inherent general powers to maintain order on the campus,. a court need
not consider the specific claim by a student that the rule under which he was punished
suffered from unconstitutional vagueness. This seems no more defensible than ignoring
such a claim on the grounds that Dixon or First Amendment protections are available to
the student.
100. See cases cited note 31 supra.
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priate in a given situation. Thus, they may waive its application when
the problems that the doctrine is designed to solve are not present or,
if present, would be difficult or impossible to eliminate. However, consideration of the factors that have dissuaded courts from invalidating
vague standards in contexts other than university discipline does not
explain the courts' failure to apply the vagueness doctrine on campus. '1 1
First, the courts have relaxed the requirement of precision when
greater specificity seems unattainable. 10 2 On occasion universities ap.
pear to have convinced courts that they could not anticipate all modes
of anti-social behavior. 0 3 That student misconduct takes diverse and
unpredictable forms is undeniable. But, in exempting university officials from the vagueness doctrine the courts have relieved them of any
obligation to seek precision at all. This is inappropriate, for experience
indicates that a relatively high degree of precision can be attained. The
University of Oregon recently replaced its vague misconduct provisions
with a series of relatively precise rules predicated on specified interests
of the university. 04 One observer has commented, on the basis of the
Oregon experience, that:
It is a fiction that no university code can adequately inform students of all rules duly adopted that carry disciplinary sanctions
* , . without including some very general catchall rules of good
conduct .... 105
Some courts fear that to particularize proscribed conduct might even
invite misbehavior by some students. Thus, one court has exempted a
state university from the vagueness doctrine on the ground that "detailed codes of prohibited student conduct are provocative." 100 In view
of the ease with which a campus code may be amended, however, there
will be few who can persist in frustrating the university. 07
Second, as noted earlier, 08 the courts have held that a standard of
101. Two factors that have led courts to tolerate vagueness-the fact that sanctiong are
not severe and the fear that a requirement of precision will unduly interfere with ad.
ministrative flexibility-are discussed at pp. 1271-73 and pp. 1280-84 supra, respectively.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947); Sproles v. Binford, 280 U.S.
874, 393 (1932); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426,
434 (1915); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. ICC 221 U.S. 612 620 (1911); Note, The Void.For.Vague.
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 67, 95 (1960).
103. See note 96 supra.
104. Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed from Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv, 40 (1966).
105. Id. at 63.
106. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 153, 146.
47 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
107. See pp. 1283-84 supra.
108. See note 63 supra.
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conduct which is vague on its face may be constitutionally acceptable if
a precise meaning can be imputed to it from some external source.
For example, "constructive notice," from either official warnings' 1 3 or
widely recognized campus standards,- 0 has on occasion managed to save
an otherwise vague university rule."' Presumably, constructive notice
would also enable a reviewing court to assess the constitutionality of a

campus rule and the fairness of its application. But though official
warnings or well-defined campus standards may eliminate the problems
of insufficient notice and inadequate judicial review, the other evils
remain. Vague rules, even when supplemented with notice, confer upon
an enforcement official unlimited freedom to proscribe whatever he
pleases. Nor is the "chilling effect" mitigated by constructive notice."2
Thus, even when there is viable constructive notice, the vagueness
doctrine retains unique utility.
III. Implications of the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus
This Note has suggested that many university regulations exhibit the
elements necessary for application of the vagueness doctrine, that the
special nature of the university heightens the need for that doctrine and
that the arguments frequently advanced by the courts for putting it
aside are unpersuasive. Thus, courts ought to apply the vagueness doctrine to disciplinary codes.

109. In Cornette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 955, 941 (rex. Civ. App. 196M the court
noted that petitioner had been warned repeatedly that the precise conduct for which he
was eventually disciplined would lead to punishment. Two prior suspensions of a student
for similar conduct were deemed to constitute notice in Steier v. New York State Educ.
Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960). See also Esteban
v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969), affg 290 F. Supp. 622
(W.D. fo. 1968), cert. denied, 598 U.S. 965 (1970); O'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d
150, 157 (Ky.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 40 (1969). Nor could a student who courts punishment

by intentional misconduct, perhaps to dramatize an issue or to test the constitutionality of
a regulation, convincingly contend that he lacked fair warning. Such, at least, is the suggestion in Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D. Colo. 1968).
110. The court in Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.. 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr.463 (1967), assumed that the students were acquainted with campus norms of social
behavior and would read them into the university's general misconduct rules.
111. "Constructive notice" has also been derived from the common law, judicial or ad.
ministrative "glosses" of statutory language, and from ordinary experience and usage. See
generally United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374,
393 (1932); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925); Omaechevarria v.
Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 573, 376-78 (1913); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 US. 86, 108
(1905); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. RLV.
67, 84 (1960).
112. Although the student who is found to have violated a vague rule has not been
chilled with respect to the conduct for which he is punished, other students may have been.
Furthermore, vague rules may well have discouraged him and others from participating in
a host of activities in which they might have engaged but for their fear of punishment.
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One implication of a judicially-imposed requirement of precision is
that a university's sense of community may be impaired.113 By becoming
a partisan in campus disputes, the court may foster a litigious spirit
among students and embitter the academic community. 14 Such predictions, however, usually stem from the imposition of specific requirements by the courts rather than from judicial intervention per se. Such
was the argument against the introduction of trial-type hearings before
and after the Dixon case." 5 There is little doubt that campus unrest, and
with it a growing assertiveness by students of their constitutional rights,
has strained relations within the university. But, since this development
is part of a larger social and political upheaval, it is unlikely that Dixon
and the cases which followed it were responsible for undermining goodwill and understanding on campus.""' Rather than being a cause of
assertiveness and unrest, Dixon was more probably its result.
Commentators continue, nonetheless, to disagree over whether and
to what extent a full blown judicial model will subvert the spirit of
common purpose essential to higher education. 17 The effects of each
step in the direction of greater formality of university discipline have
113. Courts have expressed concern that such requirements would be "detrimental to
the educational atmosphere and functions of a university." Goldberg v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 881, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1967). See also Knight v. State
Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
114. The dissenting opinion in Dixon lamented that "[e]very attempt at discipline
would probably lead to a cause c~l&bre, in connection with which federal functionaries
would be rushed in to investigate whether a federal law had been violated." 29-1 F.2d 150,
165 (5th Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J. dissenting), rev'g 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), cert,
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See generally Beaney, Students, Higher Education and the
Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 515-17 (1968); Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69
MicH. L. R.v. 393, 405 (1971); Perkins, The University and Due Process, 62 Amx. LinumaR
Ass'N BULL. 977, 978-79, 981 (1968); But see Bse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, 54 AM. AsS'N OF U. PROF. BuLL. 143, 146 (1968).
115. Objection to judicially-imposed formalities in university disciplinary procedures
permeated a number of cases long pre-dating Dixon. See, e.g., Tanton v. Mclcnney, 226
Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); State ex rel. Crain v. Hamilton, 42 Mo. App. 24 (1890):
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 215, 263 P. 433, 437, appeal dismissed, 278
U.S. 661 (1928); Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A, 220 (1923). Yet not all
the older cases so feared the introduction of trial type procedures. See, e.g., Commonwealth
ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 77 (1887).
More recently, reluctance to require formal hearings on campus has been expressed In
the following cases: Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir, 1961)
(Cameron, J., dissenting), rev'g 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), cert. denied, 868 U.S.
930 (1961); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967); Dehaan v. Bran.
deis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248
Cal. App. 2d 867, 880-81, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472-73 (1967). See especially, Carrington, Civili.
zing UniversityDiscipline,69 MicH. L. REV. 393 (1971).
116. Among the many discussions of the changing student-university relationship see
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. Rrv.
290 (1968); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969); Sym.
posium, Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); Conference, Legal
Aspects of Student-Institutional Relationships,45 DENVER L.J. 497 (1963); Note, Develop.
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
117. See notes 113-14 supra.
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been hotly debated.11 8 Presumably each additional step has been and
will be taken only after a careful consideration of the totality of its
effects on the university including that community's sense of purpose.
Apparently Dixon reflects a judgment that the benefits of a hearing
prior to student dismissal outveigh its costs to the university. In any
event, precision in rule-making does not raise for a community the
same problems as an adversarial hearing. Precise rules do not entail
conflict in the sense that formal hearings, almost by definition, seem to.
In clarifying university policy, in acquainting students with their rights
and duties, and in eliminating the other evils of vagueness, precision is
as supportive of a familial as of an adversarial approach to discipline. In
fact, imprecise rules seem to have their own adverse effects upon an
academic community."" Thus, in recent campus crises, vague rules
exacerbated rather than alleviated the already volatile campus atmosphere. Post mortems on those controversies identified imprecise rules
as a source of confusion and rancor.2 0 In fact, a rule-making process in
which students, faculty and administrators came together to exchange
and to reconcile their diverse views, might have fostered the mutual
understanding essential to a peaceful resolution of campus conflict 2'The introduction of the vagueness doctrine on campus has other implications. The vague rules that have been in operation have afforded

the university considerable latitude in dealing with an individual's misconduct, leaving administrators free to establish a pattern of discipline
without revealing its precise purpose, to depart from that pattern at
will, or to discipline students on an entirely ad hoc basis. By enabling
administrators to establish a disciplinary policy without articulating it,
vague rules have made them less accountable to public pressure.
When, under compulsion of the vagueness doctrine, however, the
university begins to define formally and for the first time the rights and

118. Concerning the Dixon decision see notes and comments in 85 TnrLEx LQ. 437
(1962); 15 VAND. L REv. 1005 (1962); 75 HA~v. L. REv. 1429 (1962); 38 N.D. L REV. 346
(1962); 60 Mcn. L. REv. 499 (1962); 50 GEo. L.J. 814 (1961); 14 ALA. L. REv. 126 (1961).
119. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. RLv. 1027, 1063 (1969);
Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplina7y Regulations 29 Oino Sr. .J. 1023, 1036 (1963).
120. Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights and Responsibilities, 54 QC.xt'.
I. REv. 23, 37 (1966) (Berkeley): Cox COMUSSION, CPlsS AT COLU M: REMPIr OF TIE
FACr-FINDING ComMssioN APvoiNTED To INVESTIGATE TnE DsrujAwcrs AT COLU=MIA Utr.vsrry iN Airm AND MAY, 1968, (the Cox Commission Report) at 70 (1908).

121. Professor Wright, commenting in The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L.

REv. 1027, 1087 (1969), emphasizes the community-building potential of rule-making-

Needed changes to meet constitutional criteria can, of course, be made by administrative or regential fiat, but to do so is to overlook the obvious opportunity that this
task presents to deepen the sense that there is an academic community, of which
students, faculty, administrators, and regents are all part, by permitting all of the
elements in the community to participate in the process.
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obligations of its students, interested groups will be presented with an
unprecedented opportunity to influence disciplinary policy. 1 2 Of
course, the advent of precise rules will enlarge the scope of student
freedom on all campuses by eliminating the possibility of entrapment,
of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment, and of the "chilling effect."
But these interested groups-alumni of the university, parents of its
students and public figures both national and local-can be expected to
exert pressure on the draftsmen of disciplinary regulations either to
enlarge or to reduce the scope of student rights. If they feel that the
university is too restrictive, or more likely, too permissive, in its disciplinary policy, they may withdraw their political and financial support without which the university cannot survive. 123 Since state
universities rely so heavily on such support, they are particularly vulnerable to these pressures.1 24 It may therefore seem appropriate for
them to make public favor a dominant consideration behind disciplinary policy. Depending upon the views of university officials and their
ability to resist external influences, political pressures will in any event
determine the substance of student rights.
The code that results from this interplay may on certain campuses
free students to engage in a wider range of activities. But preliminary
indications suggest that the opposite may occur at many if not most
universities. For example, the University of Arizona, which voluntarily
undertook to rewrite its disciplinary code in more precise terms, far

122. One recent decision attributed the dilemma of the state university official at least
in part to anticipated reactions of legislators:
The leaders of great universities are frequently required to make agonizing, hard de.
cisions which may well affect the very existence of the university as a free institution.
On one side the university president must consider what the legislature may think;
on the other, he must consider what the militant students may think.
Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1970). Commentators have also noted the
vulnerability of universities to external pressures. See, e.g., Note, Uncertainty in College
DisciplinaryRegulations,29 OHIo ST. L.J. 1023, 1034 (1968):
The dependence of the state institution and its administrators upon the legislature
and governor for funds and employment creates political pressures upon the adminis,
tration. The politician who responds to public demands will exert pressure upon
administrators to discipline students whose activities are offensive to the public. The
existence of general conduct regulations often permits such pressures to be cffcctively
applied, with the results that students with unpopular views are dismissed from
college for expressing those views.
See also Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MicH. L. Rav. 393, 406 (1971);
Kenniston & Lerner, The Unholy Alliance Against the Campus, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970,
(Magazine) at 28; Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1084
(1969).
123. See note 122 supra.
124. It has been suggested, however, that precise rules actually give the university ad.
ministrator greater independence than he would have under vague rules, because they
insulate from pressure to punish conduct which has not been specifically proscribed. Note,
Uncertainty in College DisciplinaryRegulations, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1034 (1968).
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from becoming more liberal, drastically restricted the scope of student
freedom.2 5
If this trend continues, the courts can anticipate a rising volume of
challenges on substantive grounds to the validity of particular disciplinary regulations.' - 6 With familiar constitutional tests they can, as they

have done elsewhere, seek to accommodate on campus the often divergent interests of the individual and those who govern him.
125. Crackdown on Campus, Nmvsw.m, Dec. 7, 1970, at 96. The Arizona Code includes
the following prohibitions:
Distribution or wearing of arm bands, buttons or signs or the carrying or posting
of signs, banners or posters having an obscene or controversial significance in a manner
which distracts and substantially interferes with the normal activities or appropriate
discipline of the university ....

Participation in any crowd, assembly, parade, demonstration, sit-in or similar event

which substantially interferes with or disrupts the normal activities of the university
or any university sponsored or supervised function.
Publish or threaten to publish any malicious falsehood, expressed by writing.

printing or pictures, which tends to impeach the honest, integrity or reputation of
any member of the University Community or which tends to bring such person into

disrepute, contempt or ridicule.
126. For some discussion of the substantive limits of university rule-making see Canington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 liciH. L. Rav. 393, 400 (1971). Note, The Emerging
Law of Students' Rights, 23 A .. L. REv. 619, 628-33 (1970); Note, Private Government on
the Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 72 YAxL I.J. 1362, 1395-1403 (1963).

1291

